COMPETITION BETWEEN LOBBIES IN A DEGROOT FRAMEWORK - XAVIER VENEL - LUISS

Abstract : We analyze a class of stochastic games where two lobbies compete by influencing the opinions in a society. We assume that the opinions evolve according to De Groot opinion formation and that the decisions of the lobbies change the structure of the network representing the society. Based on two recent papers, I will present several results on the regularity of discounted Nash equilibrium payoffs when players become patient and on how the players should play in some particular cases.


Bio: Xavier Mathieu Raymond Venel is Associate Professor of Game Theory at Luiss Guido Carli. One of Xavier's main direction of research is the analysis of Stochastic Games and its application to other topics (lobbying in networks, repeated game with switching costs). More generally, his interest lies in any models involving strategic interactions between agents. Xavier is co-organizer of the One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar and member of the research group INdAM-GNAMPA.